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Trust and Fiscal Performance: A Panel Analysis with Swiss Data 
 
Summary 
Citizens are willing to abandon their short-term financial interest in free-riding 
considerably, if governments act in their interest, if procedures of the public decisions-
making process are felt to be fair and if other fellow-citizens have to contribute also an 
adequate share to the community. In such a situation trustworthiness of a government 
and trust in a government is high. This paper provides empirical evidence that trust is 
crucial for fiscal performance using data for the full sample of Swiss cantons over the 
1981-2001 period. In cantons with high levels of trust, the level of indebtedness is 
significantly lower. Trust supports fiscal discipline. In order to get a useful 
approximation for mutual trust among citizens and between citizens and their 
representatives, we use information from direct voter participation on political issues 
(initiatives and public referenda) held in Swiss state (cantonal) governments. Electoral 
support of government proposals reveals an important aspect of trust in a real world 
setting. Hence, our trust variable measures the behavior at the ballots thereby reducing 
possible subjective biases derived from surveys and questionnaires.  
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Social capital is a new field, suffering from a great lack of good, reliable data. Both time 
series and cross-country evidence are missing. In the meantime much speculation is going on 
... it is hopefully clear that social capital is a promising concept, which can be operationalized 
by relatively simple measurement. However, it will take some time and a lot of work has to be 
done before it is known if social capital can deliver what it promises (p. 649). 
 
Paldam (2000, p. 649)  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Several OECD countries have accumulated large government debts over the last 30 years. Very 
much the same applies for sub-federal governments. Why do we observe large debts in certain 
governments but not in others? An explanation to that question can be found looking at the insti-
tutional framework of jurisdictions. They are particularly important for fiscal policy decisions as 
fiscal institutions create the environment, the incentives, the rules, the regulations and the con-
straints under which budgets are drafted, approved, and implemented. Fiscal institutions can 
promote fiscal discipline if properly designed while an institutional framework that results in soft 
budget constraints provides incentives for loose fiscal discipline. These rules greatly vary over 
governments and thus provide a reasonable explanation for cross-section variations in debt levels 
(Alesina and Perotti 1995, Poterba and von Hagen1999 or Persson and Tabellini 2001).  
  According to Buchanan (1980) we can broadly distinguish between quantitative and pro-
cedural institutions. Quantitative rules entail tax and expenditures limitation laws, debt brakes 
and other formal restraints to balance the budget. As empirically shown by Bohn and Inman 
(1996), Poterba (1997) or Shadbegian (1998) such budget rules can effectively support the fiscal 
discipline of policy makers. Procedural institutions define how property rights over political de-
cisions are acquired, and who can exercise them. As shown by Persson and Tabellini (2003) the  
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constitutional design of the regime type and the electoral rules also shape fiscal policy decisions 
to a significant extent.  
However, it will never be possible to design a constitution and to establish a framework 
of quantitative and procedural institutions that answers all future questions of a society. Hence, 
in all those cases where there is a degree of uncertainty, trust becomes a crucial aspect. Guerra 
and Zizzo (2003) point out that “without uncertainty, trust is not a significant issue because cer-
tainty means the outcome will be the same whether or not a trusting act was involved” (p. 3). 
Mutual trust in the case of uncertainty reduces transaction costs and makes the institutional ar-
chitecture to work smoothly (Putnam 1993, 2000; Fukuyama 1995). Trust can be seen as the 
social capital of a society. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) point out that social capital and trust 
lead to better functioning of public institutions and help in case of market imperfections. Conse-
quently, trust should be a crucial aspect in explaining fiscal policy decisions. Moreover, it is rea-
sonable to assume that deep-seated social capital fosters fiscal discipline.  
The paper concentrates on the relationship between public debts and trust in the govern-
ment using the full sample of Swiss state governments over the 1981-2001 period. We measure 
trust as the ratio of concurrence between Swiss state (cantonal) government’s recommendation 
for an issue put to a vote and the actual outcome at the ballot, but also taking into consideration 
the number of ballots per year to measure the level of citizens’ chance to express their prefer-
ences. Ballots help to increase governmental accountability, so that the government is forced to 
be responsive to citizens’ preferences and the underlying “social contract” at large, which leads 
to a higher level of fiscal discipline. Our hypothesis states that more trust in government, meas-
ured as the electoral support of government decisions is a signal for a stronger social cohesion 
between the government and the electorate and within the electorate, which in turn results in 
sounder fiscal policy decisions. The results indicate that we find a fairly robust negative relation-
ship between trust in the government and public debt. Thus, we conclude that fiscal policy is  
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strongly influenced by individuals’ trust in the government. A higher level of citizens’ trust in 
the state leads to a stronger fiscal discipline.  
To our knowledge, our paper provides some novelties compared to previous studies: 
First, empirical studies in the social capital literature often work with cross-country data. How-
ever, it is very difficult to draw conclusions from cross-cultural comparisons. Institutional and 
Cultural frameworks typical for specific countries might influence trust. The problem is that such 
features cannot always be controlled in a satisfactory manner. Our study on the other hand, fo-
cuses on within country data at the state (cantonal) level and thus allows to better isolate the im-
pact of trust. Second, social capital is usually measured by survey data asking individuals ques-
tions about trust (social trust, agreement to the statement whether most people can be trusted) 
and the level of participation in voluntary organizations. Rose-Ackerman points out that meas-
ures of generalized trust “are very difficult to interpret and to translate into concrete proposal” 
(p. 3). Glaeser et al. (2000) criticize that these survey questions are interesting but “also vague, 
abstract, and hard to interpret” (p. 812). Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that attitudinal ques-
tions predict observable behavior. Even Putnam (1995) is aware of it stressing that it would be 
desirable to have behavioural indicators of social capital. Thus, in this paper we search for a so-
cial capital proxy that measures individuals’ observable behavior rather than their attitudes or 
statements. Our behavioral trust variable that measures the behavior at the ballot reduces possi-
ble subjective biases derived from survey questionnaires. Third, a huge amount of studies work 
with cross-sectional data. Our panel analysis, covering a long period of more than 20 years, al-
lows exploiting time variation in trust, too.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows: First, we provide a quick overview of the litera-
ture on social capital and trust. Then, we develop a concept of trust revealed in a real world set-
ting and present some evidence of the level of trust among Swiss cantons over the last twenty  
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years. In section five follows the empirical implementation of the impact of trust on fiscal per-
formance while section six offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2.  Overview: Social Capital and Trust 
Social capital has been studies at length by many different disciplines. It has advanced to 
an important concept in social sciences, enforcing the interdisciplinary social discourse among 
researchers. The rapid growth of the social capital literature underlines a widespread unease with 
the standard explanations for the differential political and economic performances not only 
across nations but also across sub-national jurisdictions (Ostrom and Ahn 2003). Many studies in 
the last ten years tried to check to which extent social capital can be seen as an important omitted 
factor in previous studies.  
The political scientists Almond and Verba (1963) have been among the first who inten-
sively investigated the concept of social capital. Many years later, there has been a renewed in-
terest in the social basis of political and economic life thanks to the work by researchers such as 
Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995). Social capital advanced to an important research agenda 
in political sciences. Putnam (1993) claims the importance of social capital for the effective gov-
ernance of democracy. He defines social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, 
norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated ac-
tions” (p. 167). Many authors have singled out social capital as an important feature of produc-
tive social relationships (see, e.g., Gambetta 1988, Hardin 1993). Sociologists have also inten-
sively investigated the concept of social capital. Key figures at the beginning were Bourdieu 
(1979) and Coleman (1988, 1990). They both have strongly influenced the social capital litera-
ture focusing on individuals and small societal units. Portes and Mooney (2002) point out that 
the most widely accepted definition of the term social capital in sociology is the “the ability to 
secure resources by virtue of membership in social networks or larger social structures” (p. 305).  
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Also economists increasingly pay attention to the concept of social capital and trust. Many stud-
ies have been published in leading economic journals (see, e.g., Knack and Keefer 1997, Zak and 
Knack 2001, Glaeser et al. 2000, Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). For example, Knack and Keefer 
(1997) tested the impact of civic duty and trust on growth and investment rates in a cross section 
analysis. They find a strong and significant positive relationship between social capital variables 
and economic growth. Looking at the public finance literature, Slemrod (1998) argues that the 
social capital derived from the willingness to pay taxes voluntarily lowers the cost of the operat-
ing government and of equitably assigning its cost to citizens. Social capital has also attracted 
non-academic institutions such as the World Bank, which developed a Social Capital Initiative 
focusing mainly on developing countries and investigating the practical relevance of this con-
cept. Grootaert (2001, pp. 10-11) stresses that there are three major views on social capital: First, 
the concept developed by Putnam (1993) interpreting social capital as a social network, as net-
works of civic engagement facilitating coordination and cooperation.
 Second, Coleman’s (1988, 
p. 598) approach defines social capital as “a variety of different entities”, consisting of some 
aspects of social structure and facilitating certain actions of actors. This allows taking into ac-
count not only horizontal but also vertical social relationships. The third concept considers the 
social and political environment that enforces norms and shapes social structures.  
  According to Paldam (2000, p. 630), there are three families of social capital concepts: 
trust, cooperation and network. He points out that “most people build trust in and networks to 
others and come to cooperate with them” (p. 629). Trust and cooperation are closely related. He 
defines social capital as the ability of a person to work voluntarily together with others, for a 
common purpose in groups and organizations (p. 635). But what exactly is trust? There are dif-
ferent conceptualizations of trust. Uslaner (2002) differentiates between moralistic trust and stra-
tegic trust. Strategic trust reflects “expectations about how other people will behave” (p. 23). On 
the other hand, “moralistic trust is a statement about how people should behave. People ought to  
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trust each other” (p. 23). Thus, moralistic trust works also in the absence of reciprocity. In a fur-
ther step, Uslaner (2002) points out that the distinction between strategic and moralistic trust is a 
“continuum from particularized to generalized trust” (p. 26)
1. Generalized trust is the belief that 
most people can be trusted and thus does not dependent upon specific individual or group char-
acteristics. On the other hand, particularized trust is the belief that only a specific individuals or 
groups can be trusted
2.  While particularized trust relies strongly upon experiences (strategic 
trust), moralistic trust is the foundation of generalized trust. Uslaner points out that the “central 
idea distinguishing generalized from particularized trust is how inclusive your moral community 
is” (pp. 26-27).  
If trust is a multidimensional concept, not only the analytical distinction between particu-
larized and generalized trust is relevant, but also the empirical one. To measure generalized trust, 
many researchers have relied upon the following survey question derived by Rosenberg (1956) 
many years ago: “Generally speaking, do you believe most people can be trusted or can’t you be 
too careful in dealing with people?”. It indicates that not only well-know people are trusted but 
also strangers. Particularized trust can be measured using group categories to classify people in 
their own network, for example, asking survey questions regarding respondents’ trust in their 
neighbors, friends, co-workers or family and club members. Contrary to previous studies we try 
to find with field data a proxy that measures individuals’ observable behavior rather than meas-
uring trust with survey data. Observing the behavior at the ballots reduces possible subjective 
biases derived from survey questionnaires. Glaeser et al. (2000) combined experiments and sur-
                                                  
1 See also Granovetter (1973) who also differentiates between generalised trust and specific trust.   
2 Other researchers use similar concepts, for example, thin and thick trust, bonding and bridging social capital,  per-
sonal and social trust (see, e.g., Williams 1988, Putnam 1993, 2000, Rahn and Transue 1998).   
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veys together and find that standard attitudinal questions do not predict subject choices in their 
experiments
3. 
Our investigation in this paper grounds basically on the third concept, which takes the 
more formalized institutional relationship between state and citizens at the vertical level into 
account. As trust is a multidimensional concept, we restrict our focus on a specific dimension: 
citizens’ political trust. This is in line with Rothstein (2003), who argues that the explanation of 
social capital is much more grounded in political instead of sociological variables. 
 
3.  Trust in Politics  
There are three ways in which trust affects government performance according to Knack (1999). 
First, trust broadens government accountability. Policy decisions have to be responsive to the 
preferences of a large part of the population. Knack (1999), for example, provides empirical evi-
dence, that US states with a higher social capital significantly perform better than the other 
states. Second, trust can facilitate an agreement, where political preferences are polarized. Third, 
social cohesion in a society is a breeding ground for innovations in politics. In general, the space 
for innovations is greater if trust between members of a society is established. If new challenges 
have to be tackled, governments with high social capital are more flexible in adapting to the new 
circumstances than regions with widespread interests. Little political polarization in regions with 
a strong social cohesion makes it easier for the government to implement policies preferred by 
the electorate. Moreover, little social fragmentation in the society reduces the asymmetry be-
tween spending claims of different interest groups and taxing decisions. Therefore, a more ho-
mogenous citizenry supports fiscal discipline.  
                                                  
3 However, questions about trusting attitudes seem to predict trustworthiness. The authors conclude that “to deter-
mine whether someone is trusting, ask him about specific instances of past trusting behaviors. To determine whether 
someone is trustworthy, ask him if he trusts others” (p. 840).   
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Government accountability can be seen as the most important aspect of trust with respect 
to fiscal performance. Engagement, involvement and participation in political and public issues 
by a large part of the electorate are an important feature to hold politicians and bureaucrats ac-
countable. In Putnam (2000, p. 346) words: “Citizens in civic communities expect better gov-
ernment, and (in part through their own efforts) they get it … if decision makers expect citizens 
to hold them politically accountable, they are more inclined to temper their worst impulses rather 
than face public protests”. Political participation in ballots allows citizens to discuss the topics 
and helps to improve political awareness. Thus, the government knows that citizens are discuss-
ing and monitoring their behaviour, which will produce the incentive to govern more effectively. 
It also offers citizens the possibility to articulate themselves and thus to visualize their prefer-
ences which contributes to a more effective governance, too. As the government is better aware 
of citizens’ preferences, policies will better reflect citizens’ needs (see Boix and Posner 1998).  
Game theory and experimental findings have shown that trust facilitates the co-operation 
between the actors and allows reaching superior social outcomes. However, Boix and Posner 
(1998) criticize that such an investigation “leaves us without an explicit articulation of the 
mechanism by which the ability of people in society to co-operate affects the performance of the 
governmental institutions (p. 689)”. Our study takes this into account by trying to investigate the 
interaction between citizens and their state. Trust in politics measures the level of confidence 
citizens have in their political leaders or institutions. In these cases trust is close to “approval” 
and “validation” revealing a widespread belief that the government is carrying-out those actions 
that are in the interest of the citizenry (Slemrod 2003). To capture such an interpretation of trust, 
contrary to previous studies, we measure trust as the ratio of concurrence between Swiss state 
(cantonal) government’s recommendation for an issue put to a vote and the actual outcome at the 
ballot, but also taking into consideration the number of ballots per year to measure the level of 
citizens’ chance to express their preferences. Thus, we have a trust proxy that measures indi- 
 
10
viduals’ observable behavior interacting with the government, rather than measuring trust with 
survey data.  
If the citizens and the authorities interact in a sense of collective responsibility influenced 
by the institutional structures, then the system may be better governed and its policies may be 
more effective. Trust promotes effectiveness through its impact on governments’ behavior. In 
our paper we focus on public debt as dependent variable. It is reasonable to argue that a prudent 
debt management and thus a certain level of fiscal discipline can be seen as a proxy for govern-
mental performance. Ballots help to increase governmental accountability, so that the govern-
ment is forced to be responsive to citizens’ preferences and the underlying “social contract” at 
large, favoring a higher level of fiscal discipline. Trust in government is a signal for a stronger 
social cohesion between the government and the electorate and within the electorate, which in 
turn results in sounder fiscal policy decisions. Thus, the following hypothesis can be derived:  
  
Hypothesis: The stronger trust is established in a jurisdiction the better its fiscal performance.  
 
4.  Measuring Trust in the Swiss Cantons 
The political process in Swiss cantons offers a fruitful database to measure trust. In our case, we 
use information from direct voter participation on political issues by voter initiatives and public 
referenda as an approximation for mutual trust among citizens and between citizens and their 
representatives. Several aspects of trust are of importance in the process of direct voter participa-
tion in Switzerland. To launch a voter initiative or to veto government decisions by a popular 
referendum represent possibilities to reveal distrust in the government. Even if we assume that 
the government is benevolent, such instruments can be useful in case the governments fall out of 
step and make mistakes in interpreting voters’ preferences (Matsusaka, 2004). This may happen  
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as a result of strong political polarization on a specific issue or high information costs. Contrar-
ily, if social cohesion in the electorate is strong, it is easier for the government to implement 
policies according to the preferences of the electorate. They make fewer mistakes in interpreting 
the voters’ preferences. Hence, if social cohesion is strong, fewer decisions by the government 
will be vetoed and fewer voter initiatives will be successfully launched. As a consequence, sup-
port of government decisions by the electorate is a useful indication of trust and social capital 
among members of a society.  
Assuming now that the government is not benevolent in any case,   direct  voter  participa-
tion in this case is a possibility to control the discretionary power of politicians. Voter control 
can help to limit the abuse of political power by selfish politicians. As citizens cannot completely 
foresee the preferences of their incumbents, elements of direct democracy empowers them with 
an instrument to control their government. This also has an ex ante effect on policy formulation 
by the elected incumbents since they always have to take into account a possible voter interven-
tion. If politicians should try to abuse their policy discretion, voters will increasingly reject the 
governments’ proposals. Thus, the support of government decisions by direct voter participation 
is also a measure of trust in government. If government proposals acknowledge common inter-
ests, voters will support the trustworthiness of their incumbents at the ballots.  
Table 1: Ballots in all 26 Swiss cantons from 1981 to 2001 
Number of ballots  3100 
Average number of ballots per year  148 
Average number of ballots per canton  119 
Lowest value (number of ballots)  22 (Jura) 
Highest value (number of ballots)  285 (Zurich)* 
Ratio of accepted government proposals  75.7 % 
Highest value (Ratio of accepted government proposals)  94.3 % (Appenzell a. Rh.) 
Lowest value (Ratio of accepted government proposals)  37.7 % (Jura) 




In order to take both aspects of trust into account – trust among members of a society and trust 
between principal and agent – we collected data from all cantonal ballots held between 1981 and 
2001 in all 26 Swiss cantons
4. As can be seen in Table 1, 3100 cantonal ballots were held while 
75.7 % of them succeeded in the sense of supporting the government proposals. The variation 
goes from Jura with a ratio of 37.7 % to Appenzell a. Rh. with a ratio of 94.3 % accepted gov-
ernment proposals. Interestingly, the number of ballots held varies quite a lot among cantons.  
 
The reason is that some cantons offer much broader possibilities of voter participation than other 
cantons (see Feld and Matsusaka 2003 or Feld, Schaltegger and Schnellenbach, 2004). In order 
to take this institutional variation into account, we use state (cantonal) intercepts in our regres-
sion analyses since the institutional provisions on direct legislation hardly changes over time. 
However, the number of ballots held does not only give us information on the institutional varia-
tion but also on mutual trust. This is important in our case because the mere acceptance rate of 
ballots held during a year does not cover this special aspect of trust. More ballots imply a higher 
validation of policy choices by the government. Higher validation or shorter intervals between 
ballots is of importance when preferences of the electorate are changing or when there is uncer-
tainty about preferences on a concrete policy project (Matsusaka 2004). Ballots provide addi-
                                                  
4 No distinction between initiative and referendum has been done to measure both horizontal and vertical trust.  
Figure 1: Trust measured as government support (acceptance X validation) for 26 Swiss 

































































tional information for the government, which in turn enriches the decision-making process
5. 
Thus, we construct our trust measure by the ratio of at the ballots accepted government proposals 
multiplied with the number of ballots held (acceptance X validation). This particular measure of 
trust allows us to incorporate both aspects of trust: Acceptance of government decisions and 
validation of government decisions. We include both measures in our trust variable, as they are 
not independent of each other. The validation of government decisions fosters acceptance of 
government decisions offering individuals the change to express their preferences. Thus, prefer-
ences of the people bearing the costs and benefits of government actions are visible which fosters 
citizens’ trust. On the other hand, a higher acceptance of government decisions preserves gov-
ernment’s interests to use ballots as an instrument and thus preserves the validation of govern-
ment decisions
6. This makes it useful to include both aspects in one variable in our model.  
As Figure 1 shows trust varies considerably among cantons over the 1981-2001 period. 
The lowest value accounts for 0.57 represented by canton Jura while the highest value with 13 
belongs to the canton Glarus. Similarly, there is a variation of trust over time as can be seen in 
Figure 2. With 3.615 the lowest value of trust is observed in 2001 while in 1988 trust was high-
est with a value of 5.75. Such a strong variation among cantons as well as over time allows ex-
ploiting within-country variation to identify effects of trust on governments’ fiscal performances. 
It is also important to note, that the correlation between real GDP-growth and trust is only 
0.0323, indicating that our measure is not just reflecting subjective well-being or perhaps even 
government’s general popularity, which has been found in many empirical studies to be influ-
enced by economic development
7. In general, a multivariate analysis conducted in the next sec-
tion will allow isolating the impact of trust on public debt.  
                                                  
5 In general, previous studies have shown that repeated interactions or a higher level of familiarity facilitate trust 
(see, e.g., Glaeser et al. 2000, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002).  
6 This arguments is supported looking at the level of correlation between the variables. Furthermore, it should be 
noticed that using it as one variable leads to slightly better predictions.  











5.   Empirical investigation 
In order to test whether trust fosters fiscal discipline, we propose the following baseline equa-
tion:  
 
 DEBTit = α + β CTRLit +ζ TRUSTit + TDt + CDi + εit  (1) 
 
where i indexes the 26 cantons in the sample, DEBTit denotes the cantonal debt-levels per capita 
and per GDP over the 1981-2001 period and TRUSTit is our indicator for trust described in the 
previous section. The regression contains also several control variables CTRLit like GDP per cap-
ita, share of urban population, share of workforce, share of population with higher schooling, 
share of unemployed, share of pensioners, share of pupils, population and a variable for the share 
of German speaking population in a canton. In order to control for time as well as cantonal in-
Figure 2: Trust measured as government support (acceptance X validation) from 1981 to 2001, 
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variant factors we include fixed time TDt and fixed cantonal CDi effects. εit denotes the error 
term.  
  In Table 2 and 3 we present three different kind of empirical methodologies: pooling, 
random effect and fixed effect regressions using cantonal debt-levels per capita (Table 2) and 
debt levels per GDP (Table 3) as dependent variables. In the pooled estimations we present the 
beta or standardized regression coefficients to compare the magnitude and thus to see the rela-
tive importance of the used variables. To get robust standard errors in the pooled estimations, we 
also used the Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors. To check which one is most 
suitable, we perform the Langrangian Multiplier (LM) test (see Breusch and Pagan 1980) to test 
the random effect versus the pooling model and the Hausman specification test (see Hausman 
1978) to compare the fixed effect versus the random effect model. The LM test indicates that the 
null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level for both dependent variables. This sug-
gests that pooling regression is less suitable than random effect regression. The Hausman test 
shows that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level in Table 2 and rejected at 
the 1% significance level in Table 3. This suggests that it is more appropriate to use fixed effect 
models. Thus, for all the following extensions we present fixed effect regressions.  
As can be seen by the multivariate analysis trust has a statistically significant negative 
impact on fiscal discipline (public debt) in all the regressions presented in Table 2 and 3, control-
ling for other determinants. Thus, our hypothesis finds strong empirical support looking at Swiss 
cantons over the periods 1981-2001. However, it can be criticized that institutional differences 
reflect long-standing differences in voters’ trust towards the government. To check whether this 
argument holds, Appendix D presents estimations controlling for democratic participation rights.  
The used direct democracy index reflects the extent of direct democratic participation (1= lowest  
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and 6 highest degree of participation) at the cantonal level.
8 As can be seen in most of the cases, 
the variable TRUST remains statistically significant after controlling for democratic participation 
rights. A higher level of direct democratic participation rights has also a significantly negative 
effect on public debts. Appendix D indicates a relatively strong quantitative effect. In general, it 
should be noticed that there is a relatively high correlation between trust and the index of direct 
democracy (r=0.42***, significant at the 0.01 level), which may explain the lower effect of the 
TRUST variable. Our TRUST variable also takes into account the number of ballots held and 
thus controls for institutional variation. Furthermore, trust and direct democratic participation 
rights are not independent of each others. A higher level of direct democracy may foster trust as 
it imposes credible constraints on politicians and public officials. Trust is then a rational re-
sponse to it (see Rose-Ackerman 2001). Sztompka (1999) points out that “the more there is insti-
tutionalized distrust, the more there will be spontaneous trust” (p. 140). Not surprising, in most 
of the cases the real GDP per capita reduces public debts significantly and sizeable, too. On the 
other hand, the share of urban population pushes up debt levels. This points to a higher govern-
mental willingness to increase public debts in urban areas, which may be caused by specific 
problems of central cities like social heterogeneity. The provision and maintenance of central 
city infrastructure such as higher education, traffic, public health, public security or cultural fa-
cilities require high government revenue for the central city. At the same time, the tax bases in 
central cities are sensitive to high tax burdens. People react to tax incentives and move from the 
center to nearby local communities where the tax burden is lower. The asymmetry of spending 
claims and revenue capacity is often seen as a major driving force for problems of fiscal disci-
pline in urban jurisdictions (Frey 1990, Brueckner 1983). Socio-demographical factors such as 
                                                  
8 The index includes the four legal instruments: the popular initiative to change the canton’s constitution, the popular 
initiative to change the canton’s law, the compulsory and the optional referendum to prevent new law or changing of 
a law and the compulsory and the optional referendum to prevent new state expenditure. The index is based on the 
degree of restrictions in form of the necessary signatures to use an instrument, the time span to collect the signatures 
and the level of new expenditure which allows to use the financial referendum (for a detailed discussion see Stutzer 
1999).   
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the share of elderly and the share of pupils expectably push up debt-levels, too. These two 
groups only perceive a small fraction of the initiated costs eventually creating pressure for higher 
government spending. In addition, especially pensioners have an incentive to finance public ser-
vices by deficit spending in order to postpone the costs to future generations (Meltzer and Rich-
ard 1981). The language variable is significantly negative indicating that the German speaking 
population cares more about fiscal discipline than their French and Italian speaking counterparts. 
The result is very much in line to the results in federal ballots and the behaviour of members of 
parliament from the roman part of Switzerland. The other control variables have not a robust and 
significant impact on public debt. In particular, there seems not to be a significant positive im-
pact of better educated citizens on fiscal discipline. Obviously, better educated voters do not de-
mand a more fiscally prudent government, which is somewhat surprising. One could have 
thought of a “supply side” effect since better educated citizens provide a larger tax base which in 
turn  may make it easier to offer higher salaries to the public servants and also provide a larger 
pool of talents from which the government can recruit (Knack 1999).  
In addition, we have included a variable capturing the degree of centralization of canton 
governments in Switzerland to check the sensitivity of our results. As shown by Shadbegian 
(1999) and other researchers for US states and by Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003) and 
Schaltegger (2003) for Swiss cantons government centralization favors the size of government. 
De Mello (2004) shows that fiscal decentralization also strengthens social capital in a cross-
country study. Thus, it is not surprising that in our analysis government centralization is of high 
explanatory power for the level of government indebtedness, too. Note that also after including 
government centralization, trust remains an important and significant feature in explaining fiscal 
performance of governments. 
Next, proprietors of houses have made a commitment to their jurisdiction by voluntarily 
increasing their opportunity costs for the exit option to migrate to another jurisdiction. This can  
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be seen as an alternative measure of trust in government
9. However, the inclusion of the share of 
housing proprietors as a further regressor in the equation does not significantly increase the ex-
planatory power of our public debts regressions.  
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. RE: random effect, 
FE: fixed effect. OLS estimations: robust standard errors and beta coefficients. Lagrangian Multiplier test (LM test): 
test the random effect model versus the pooling regression. Hausman specification test: test the fixed-effect mode 
versus the random effect model. For definitions of variables see Appendix. 
 
                                                  
9 Note that the simple correlation of the variables “trust” and “share of housing proprietors” in our data sample is 
rather weak with a value of 0.017. 
Table 2: Regression Results on the Impact of Trust on Public Debt, 26 Swiss Cantons, 1981-2001. 
Dependent Variable: Debt per Capita 
Explanatory Variables  OLS  OLS  RE  FE  FE  FE 
-0.090*** -0.075***  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004**  -0.004**  Trust 
(-3.71) (-2.96)  (-2.76) (-2.72) (-2.58) (-2.57) 
       1.184***  1.179***  Government  
centralization         (6.22)  (6.19) 
         -0.492  Share of registered house 
proprietors           (-0.91) 
-0.055 -0.379*** 0.117 -0.806***  -1.141***  -1.089***  GDP 
(-0.57) (-2.81) (0.57) (-2.90) (-4.17) (-3.90) 
0.005 0.079  0.329 0.564 0.557  0.643*  Labor Force 
(0.16) (1.57)  (0.90) (1.53) (1.57) (1.75) 
0.347*** 0.058  0.857*** 0.227  0.160  0.186  Higher Schooling 
(4.77) (0.64)  (2.96) (0.74) (0.54) (0.63) 
0.067** 0.033  0.021***  0.004  0.002  0.003  Unemployment Rate 
(2.09) (0.45)  (2.74) (0.50) (0.21) (0.42) 
0.362*  0.613***  0.583*** 0.564** 0.734***  0.716***  Urban 
(1.90) (3.02)  (4.33) (2.51) (3.37) (3.27) 
0.593 -3.279**  -0.025  -1.553***  -1.986***  -2.049***  Population 
(0.72) (-2.56)  (-0.33) (-3.25) (-4.26) (-4.34) 
0.318***  0.210** 2.507*** 2.332*** 2.681*** 2.904***  Population > 65 
(4.53) (2.30)  (3.05) (2.53) (3.01) (3.15) 
0.636*** 0.608***  5.626*** 5.787*** 6.655*** 6.930***  Population < 15 
(6.39) (4.56)  (6.76) (6.47) (7.63) (7.50) 
-1.549*** -2.860***  -0.132  -1.856*** -1.792*** -1.732***  German Language 
(-3.18) (-4.29)  (-1.39) (-4.08) (-4.09) (-3.91) 
State (Canton) Effects  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Effects  No Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LM test      0.000       
Hausman test      0.021       
R-Squared  0.815 0.831  0.399 0.822 0.835 0.835 
#  of  Observations  546 546  546 546 546 546  
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Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. RE: random effect, 
FE: fixed effect. OLS estimations: robust standard errors and beta coefficients. Lagrangian Multiplier test (LM test): 
test the random effect model versus the pooling regression. Hausman specification test: test the fixed-effect mode 
versus the random effect model. For definitions of variables see Appendix. 
 
Other institutional variations in Swiss cantons that do hardly vary over time are not in-
cluded in our regressions since state (canton) dummy variables have been included. The canton 
dummies would render these institutional feature variables insignificant, anyway.  
  Table 4 differs from the previous tables in using instruments for our trust variable. Evalu-
ating the direct effect of trust on fiscal performance in a setting where unobserved voter prefer-
Table 3: Regression Results on the Impact of Trust on Public Debt, 26 Swiss Cantons, 1981-2001. 
Dependent Variable: Debt per GDP 
Explanatory Variables  OLS  OLS  RE  FE  FE  FE 
-0.093*** -0.066** -0.001**  -0.001** -0.001**  -0.001*  Trust 
(-3.52) (-2.44)  (-2.14) (-2.14) (-1.97) (-1.96) 
      0.354***  0.351***  Government  
centralization        (6.45) (6.41) 
        -0.227  Share of registered house 
proprietors          (-1.46) 
-0.512*** -0.876***  -0.254*** -0.481*** -0.581*** -0.557***  GDP 
(-4.84) (-6.24)  (-4.17) (-5.99) (-7.38) (-6.93) 
-0.003 0.016  0.005 0.030 0.028 0.067  Labor Force 
(-0.09) (0.29)  (0.05) (0.28) (0.27) (0.64) 
0.419*** 0.075  0.304*** 0.075  0.055  0.067  Higher Schooling 
(5.19) (0.77)  (3.58) (0.86) (0.65) (0.79) 
0.048 0.073  0.009***  0.002 0.002 0.002  Unemployment Rate 
(1.22) (0.91)  (4.11) (1.00) (0.71) (1.04) 
0.511**  0.868***  0.212*** 0.206*** 0.257*** 0.249***  Urban 
(2.18) (3.58)  (5.38) (3.18) (4.09) (3.95) 
2.781*** -1.822  -0.005  -0.223 -0.352***  -0.381***  Population 
(3.83) (-1.24)  (-0.23) (-1.61) (-2.62) (-2.81) 
0.465*** 0.314***  0.778*** 0.899*** 1.003*** 1.106***  Population > 65 
(5.40) (3.10)  (3.23) (3.38) (3.92) (4.17) 
0.967*** 0.895***  2.048*** 2.201*** 2.460*** 2.587***  Population < 15 
(7.90) (5.53)  (8.39) (8.53) (9.79) (9.75) 
-3.474*** -4.888*** -0.048*  -0.819*** -0.800*** -0.772***  German Language 
(-6.00) (-6.73)  (-1.71) (-6.24) (-6.34) (-6.06) 
State  (Canton)  Effects  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Effects  No Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LM test(Prob>chi2)     0.000     
Hausman test(Prob>chi2)     0.000     
R-Squared  0.765 0.789  0.270 0.766 0.784 0.785 
#  of  Observations  546 546  546 546 546 546  
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ences might affect both trust and fiscal performance requires an instrumental variable technique 
to separate the impact of trust from the underlying voter preferences. A suitable instrument must 
be contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error term but must be highly correlated with trust. 
In our case, we use the number of votes as an instrument. Conceivably, in cantons in which vot-
ers have frequent possibilities to reveal their trust, trust will be more likely. Now, to test for pos-
sible endogeneity of trust a Hausman test is carried out in two steps. First, we regress the number 
of votes on trust including all other regressors from equation (1). The number of votes is highly 
significant in explaining trust, as expected. Second, we take the obtained residuals from that re-
gression and include them in the original regression of equation (1). Since the coefficients of the 
included residuals are not significant (t-value of –0.187), trust can be considered as an exoge-
nous variable. Thus, unsurprisingly the coefficients of the trust variable in the two-stage least 
square estimations in Table 4 do hardly change from those obtained in the ordinary least square 
regressions. This suggests that there is not much of a reverse causation from government debt to 
trust. We cannot observe that in the 2SLS regressions the coefficients for our trust variable are 
smaller than the ones estimated using OLS, what other would indicate that reverse causation may 
bias the OLS coefficient for trust upward (see Knack 1999). In addition, reversed causality is 
unlikely in our case from a theoretical point of view: at the time when voters go to the polls, data 
on public debts of the current year are unknown and will usually be published not before the fol-
lowing year.
10  
As can be seen in Appendix C two cantons are considered as outliers. The cantons Basel-
Stadt (BS) as well as Geneva (GE) have a relatively and extraordinary high level of indebted-
ness. In the following, in order to check the robustness of the results, we take these two cantons 
out from our sample (excluding outliers). In Table 4, columns two and four present the results. 
                                                  
10 According to a yearly conducted survey on behalf of the Swiss Federal Department of Finance, the electorate is 
relatively well informed on public finances. In 2004 for example, 35 % of all the 1516 interview participants have 
estimated the accumulated level of debt for the federal level correctly (the interviews have been conducted by 
Demoscope, a professional institute on market research in Switzerland).   
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The coefficients of the trust variable remain significant even after excluding outliers indicating 
that our basic hypothesis is supported.  
 
Table 4: Sensitivity regressions on the Impact of Trust on Public Debt, 26 Swiss Cantons, 1981-2001.  
Dependent Variable: Debt per capita / debt per GDP 
Explanatory Variables  Debt p.c.♠ Debt  p.c.♣ Debt  p.c.♥ Debt  p.GDP♠ Debt  p.GDP♣   Debt p.GDP♥
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*  Trust 
(-2.64) (-2.65)  (-2.54)  (-1.827) (-2.657) (-1.93) 
   1.142***      0.341***  Government  
centralization     (6.08)      (6.32) 
   -0.447      -0.1978*  Share of Protestants 
   (-1.11)      (-1.71) 
   1.100***      0.288**  Share of Catholics 
   (2.66)     (2.43) 
-0.807*** -1.013***  -1.263*** -0.482*** -0.491*** -0.619***  GDP 
(-2.82) (-3.13)  (-4.66)  (-6.267) (-5.842) (-7.96) 
0.562 0.221  0.301 0.028  -0.011 -0.033  Labor Force 
(1.56) (0.498)  (0.81) (0.274) (-0.097) (-0.31) 
0.226 -0.097  0.139 0.074  -0.004  0.052  Higher Schooling 
(0.64) (-0.246)  (0.48) (0.758) (-0.036)  (0.62) 
0.004 0.008  -0.003 0.002  0.002 0.0002  Unemployment Rate 
(0.45) (0.876)  (-0.34) (0.913) (0.608)  (0.08) 
0.565*** 0.967***  0.922*** 0.207***  0.276***  0.312***  Urban 
(3.03) (4.293)  (4.19) (3.604) (4.457)  (4.95) 
-1.556** -2.678***  -1.104** -0.225 -0.545*** -0.073  Population 
(-2.57) (-3.954)  (-2.17) (-1.251) (-2.856)  (-0.50) 
2.332** 3.050***  3.061***  0.899*** 0.893*** 1.084***  Population > 65 
(2.30) (2.850)  (3.36) (3.103) (2.962)  (4.14) 
5.786*** 7.265***  5.230*** 2.199***  2.289***  1.931***  Population < 15 
(4.56) (5.543)  (4.77) (5.520) (5.723)  (6.13) 
-1.858*** -2.258***  -2.224*** -0.820*** -0.804*** -0.929***  German Language 
(-4.30) (-4.784)  (-5.00) (-6.741) (-6.258)  (-7.27) 
State (Canton) Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared 0.831  0.659  0.840  0.789  0.680  0.792 
# of Observations  546  504  546  546  504  546 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. For definitions of 
variables see Appendix.  
♠ denotes the two stage least square regressions. Instrument for trust is the number of votes.  
♣ denotes regression after excluding the values of the canton Basel-Stadt (BS) and the canton Geneva (GE), which 
are considered as outliers (see Appendix C). 
♥ There is a high simple correlation between the two regressors share of Protestants and share of Catholics (-0.921). 
However, eliminating either the former or the latter variable from the regression hardly changes the estimated coeffi-
cients as well as their significance level.   
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In the next step, we control for the religious composition of the cantons. Putnam (2000) recog-
nizes the religion denomination as an important factor in building social capital. Knack (1999) 
finds a high correlation between trust and the mainline Protestants in the US states. Hence, reli-
gious composition may serve as a good instrument for trust. In fact, La Porta et al. (1997) and 
Knack (1999) both use religious composition to instrument for interpersonal trust. However, in 
our case there is only a weak simple correlation between trust and the share of Protestants 
(0.394) or share of Catholics (0.348). A further sensitivity analysis has been performed in order 
to evaluate whether these two variables affect the size or the significance of our trust variable. 
Columns three and six show that trust still has a statistically significant negative impact 
on the level of indebtedness after including the two most important religious groups in Switzer-
land. Interestingly, religion denomination has an impact on fiscal performance. While we obtain 
a negative impact of Protestantism on cantonal indebtedness, the share of catholic population on 
total cantonal population is positively associated with the level of debt. The negative impact of 
the share of Protestants can be explained using the concept of Protestant ethic, that emphasizes 
specific values such as the virtues of prudent reinvestment of savings, individual entrepreneurial 
initiatives, and independence (see Weber 1930, Norris and Inglehart 2004). Such moral values at 
the individual level seemed to have an impact on states’ fiscal discipline, especially in societies 
based on active political participation rights. 
All in all, the significant impact of the trust variable remains unaffected whether we con-
trol only for one or for two religious groups, whether we additionally include government cen-
tralization or not and whether we additionally control for the share of registered house proprie-





6.  Conclusion 
This panel analysis within Switzerland provides evidence for the hypothesis that trust in a soci-
ety influences fiscal performance. The stronger mutual trust is established, the sounder fiscal 
policy decisions and hence the lower public debts. The results are robust to a number of control 
variables and the inclusion of additional variables such as government centralization or direct 
democratic participation rights in Swiss states (cantons). In our case, we use information from 
direct voter participation on political issues (voter initiatives and public referenda) held in Swiss 
state governments to measure mutual trust among citizens and between citizens and their repre-
sentatives. In order to take both aspects of trust into account – trust among members of a society 
and trust between the incumbent and the constituency – we collected data from all cantonal bal-
lots held between 1981 and 2001 in all 26 Swiss cantons. In total, we analyzed data from 3,100 
cantonal ballots that were held in our period of observation. While 75.7 % of the ballots suc-
ceeded in the sense of supporting the government proposals, 24.3% failed to support the gov-
ernment. However, since there is a considerable variation in the extent to which Swiss cantons 
offer possibilities of direct voter participation, the ratio of accepted government proposals would 
give a biased picture of trust. In order to take the institutional variation into account, we con-
struct our trust measure as the ratio of the ballots that accepted government proposals multiplied 
with the number of ballots held (acceptance X validation).  
These results are consistent with those reported by Putnam (1993) from Italian regions, 
Keefer and Knack (1997), La Porta et al. (1999) or Zak and Knack (2001) from cross-country 
regressions or Knack (1999) from US state governments for government performance. The re-
sults presented in this paper as well as in previous studies underline the importance of trust as an 
essential aspect for the well functioning of a government and the institutional architecture in 
place. However, the understanding of how social capital is built and how government can foster 
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Variable name  Description  Source 
Trust  Electoral support of government proposals 
multiplied by number of ballots (support X 
validation) 
Own investigations on the basis of the 
C2D-Database, Amtsblätter of Obwal-
den and Appenzell a. Rh. and protocols 
of town meetings in Glarus, Appenzell 
i.Rh and Nidwalden. 
Debt p. c. 
 
Cantonal debt per capita deflated to the 
year 1980 in CHF  (logarithmized in the 
estimations)  
Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
 
Debt p. GDP 
 
Nominal cantonal debt per nominal GDP  
 
Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
Share of registered 
house proprietors 
Share of registered cantonal house proprie-
tors on the cantonal population 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
Share of protestants  Share of protestant population on the total 
cantonal population 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
Share of catholics  Share of catholic population on the total 
cantonal population 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
Government  
Centralization 
Share of cantonal public spending on can-
tonal and local spending 
Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
GDP  Real cantonal GDP per capita (logarith-
mized in the estimations) 
BAK Basel Economics 
Labor Force  Share of employment on the cantonal 
population 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
Higher Schooling  Share of population with secondary 
education on the cantonal population 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Share of unemployment on the cantonal 
population 
Own calculations on the basis of Swiss 
Federal Statistical Office 
Agglomeration  Proportion of local communities having 
more than 10’000 inhabitants.  
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
Population  Cantonal population (logarithmized in the 
estimations) 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
Population > 65  Share of cantonal population over the age 
65 on total cantonal population 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
Population < 15  Share of cantonal population under the age 
15 on total cantonal population 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 





Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Trust 4.785  4.103  0  25 
Debt per capita  3850  2865  795  20453 
log (debt per capita)  3.513  0.229  2.900  0.018 
Debt per GDP  0.129 0.059 0.019  0.458 
Share of registered house proprietors  0.410 0.113 0.125  0.628 
Share of protestants  0.310 0.199 0.051  0.783 
Share of catholics  0.562 0.231 0.161  0.931 
Government Centralization  0.673  0.106  0.510  0.99 
GDP   41590  13064  26324  117228 
Labor Force  0.480  0.032  0.396  0.564 
Higher Schooling  0.137  0.059  0.023  0.334 
Unemployment Rate  0.018  0.018  0  0.078 
Agglomeration 0.324  0.249  0  0.995 
Population 261938  272497  12781  1228628 
Population > 65  0.146  0.021  0.103  0.210 
Population < 15  0.186  0.024  0.113  0.241 
German Language  0.714  0.353  0.050  0.980 
        














































































Regression Results on the Impact of Trust on Public Debt Controlling for Democratic Participation Rights, 26 Swiss 
Cantons, 1981-2001. 
Dependent Variable  Debt p.c.  Debt p.c.  Debt p.c.  Debt p.GDP  Debt p.GDP  Debt p.GDP 
Explanatory Variables  OLS  RE  FE  OLS  RE  FE 
-0.059** -0.003**  -0.003*  -0.062** -0.001  -0.001  Trust 
(-2.35) (-2.01) (-1.79) (-2.28) (-1.61) (-1.34) 
Democratic Participation  -0.650***  -0.080*** -0.106*** -0.643*** -0.016*** -0.026*** 
Rights  (-6.09) (-3.89) (-4.89) (-4.70) (-2.65) (-4.12) 
-0.086 0.019  -0.863***  -0.543***  -0.277***  -0.495***  GDP 
(-0.94) (0.09) (-3.17) (-5.29) -4.51  -6.25 
-0.010 0.222 0.341 -0.019 -0.016 -0.025  Labor Force 
(-0.34) (0.61) (0.94) (-0.59) (-0.15) (-0.24) 
0.340*** 0.980***  0.332  0.412*** 0.327***  0.101  Higher Schooling 
(4.72) (3.41) (1.11) (5.17) (3.85) (1.17) 
0.062**  0.023*** 0.004  0.043 0.009*** 0.002  Unemployment Rate 
(2.01) (3.05) (0.51) (1.14) (4.30) (1.01) 
0.217 0.548***  0.436** 0.367*  0.207***  0.175***  Urban 
(1.21) (4.01) (1.97) (1.68) (5.14) (2.72) 
0.476 -0.079  -1.431***  2.664***  -0.016 -0.193  Population 
(0.60) (-1.00) (-3.05) (2.79) (-0.68) (-1.42) 
0.279***  2.408*** 2.197** 0.426***  0.765*** 0.866***  Population > 65 
(4.09) (2.94) (2.44) (4.99) (3.16) (3.31) 
0.586*** 5.513*** 5.654*** 0.917*** 2.032*** 2.168***  Population < 15 
(5.90) (6.68) (6.47) (7.38) (8.34) (8.53) 
-1.947*** 0.069 -1.986***  -3.868*** -0.009 -0.851***  German Language 
(-4.16) (0.61) (-4.46) (-6.95) (-0.27) (-6.57) 
State  (Canton)  Effects  Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Year  Effects  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
R-Squared  0.826 0.369 0.830 0.776 0.269 0.774 
#  of  Observations  546 546 546 546 546 546 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. OLS estimations: 
robust standard errors and  beta coefficients. RE: random effect, FE: fixed effect.   
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